Changing modes of theological rationality by Hoogen, A.J.M. van den






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
Changing modes of theological rationality
Toine van den Hoogen1 
Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
A modern tradition in foundational theology: analysis o f  modes of 
thinking
Only in Schussler Fiorenza’s third period does the paradigm o f foundational 
theology focus on its type o f rationality. She defines the rationality o f 20th 
century foundational theology as the “transcendental foundation o f  Christian 
revelation and o f Christian theology” . That means that all Christian theolo­
gical issues, such as human freedom, human beings’ place in the cosmos, the 
meaning o f  Jesus and the role o f  the church, are formulated in relation to the 
concept o f revelation. Revelation is the perspective in which a question 
becomes a theological problem.2 What is the relation between human free­
dom and divine revelation, between human beings’ place in the cosmos and 
divine revelation, et cetera? Finally, Schiissler Fiorenza’s definitions imply 
that methodologically 20th century Christian theology presupposes that the 
relation to revelation must necessarily be considered with due regard to the 
knowing subject’s assumed autonomous relation to itself. That puts an end to 
the many dichotomies between revelation and freedom, revelation and 
cosmos, revelation and confession o f  Christ. The relation between revelation 
and humans’ place in the cosmos, its relation to human freedom and its 
relation to the church are all problems embedded in the knowing subject’s 
assumed autonomous relation to itself.
An important and influential example o f this consciousness o f the 
knowing subject’s assumed autonomous relation to itself is to be found in the 
oeuvre o f Johann-Baptist Metz. He introduced the concept mode o f  thinking 
(Denkform) into foundational theology. He originally3 meant the formal 
principle o f the being thought in a given (theological) construct. The category 
‘mode o f thinking’ does not refer to the logical or psychological nature o f a 
construct, be it a concept, an idea or an argument. To Metz a construct 
includes Seins-verstandnis4 Concepts, propositions, theories are in them­
selves ways o f relating to the world. Thought ‘shapes’, forms (in the
1 Guest Researcher at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, University o f  South 
Africa, Pretoria, South Africa, for this project..
2 Cf. Eicher, P. (1977), Offenbarung. Prinzip neuzeitlicher Theologie. München: Kösel.
3 Metz, J-B. (1962), Christliche Antropozentnk: über die Denkform des Thomas van Aquin, 
München: K ö se l.
4 Op. cit., p. 30, n. 6.
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Aristotelian sense o f  the word) our relation to reality. Das ein Denken 
Characterisierende ist nicht primär das in ihm Augesagte, sondern der 
vorgängig in jeder Aussage waltende Horizont.'’'’ The horizon o f our thinking 
always includes a particular relationship to reality. But, says Metz, the history 
o f philosophy contains ‘epochale D i f fe r e n z e n The relation to reality 
changes over time. For many centuries Western thought was governed by a 
cosmocentric orientation. Later it made way for an anthropocentric horizon. 
Metz cites Thomas Aquinas as a clear example o f this shift.
Metz’s concept of mode o f thinking implies a distinction between the 
content o f a theological category and the mode in which it is probed in 
theological reflection. “The task o f  foundational theology is to take note of 
the mode in which theology is done,” says the theologian Logister.5 The 
distinction between mode o f thinking and theological reflection enables us to 
exam ine the rational content o f  a theological construct in terms o f  its origin, 
merits and limitations. Thus one can distinguish between the substance o f  a 
theological concept and its relation to ecclesiastic doctrine. The notion of 
mode o f thinking introduces pluralism and falsifiability into theological 
theory o f science and frees theology from the demands and authority of 
church doctrine. The radical impact o f this new term becomes clear if  we 
compare Metz’s proposal with that o f  his teacher Karl Rahner many year 
later in his Grundkurs des Glaubens.6 Rahner, too, allowed for pluralism in 
his theological theory o f science. Scientific theology itself, he averred, has 
evolved a vast number o f separate disciplines, besides accommodating a wide 
range o f philosophical traditions.7 But this pluralism makes him insist on the 
unity o f  and the unity in theology, especially in the framework o f its current 
theory o f science and the diversity o f  addressees it has by now acquired. In 
his view human knowledge is characterised by the unity-in-difference 
between self-identity and reflection.8 A conception o f reality (e.g. of 
theology) is based on the autonomous relation to oneself which always 
inheres in knowledge o f reality as other-to-oneself. This unity o f reality and 
the person’s original self-awareness is already present in human beings’ free 
self-realisation.9 Reflection is a realisation o f this human existential quality. 
To be sure, it entails an objectifying, generalising distance from the object of 
knowledge. But, says Rahner, that distance, functioning in and via language,
5 Logister, W. (1980), Verkeerde vragen zijn fa taal. De korre lat ie tussen denkvorm en 
denkinhoud binnen de theologie als fundamentaaltheologische opgave. Inaugural lecture, 
Tilburg: Theologische Faculteit, p.26. [Our translation.]
6 Cf. K. Rahner (1999), Foundations o f  Christian fa ith . An introduction to the idea o f  
Christianity (translation o f  Grundkurs des Glaubens. Einführung in den B egriff des 
Christentums, Freiburg: Herder. 1976), New York: Crossroad.
7 Op. cit., 19.
8 Cf. op. c i t ., 15.
9 Cf. op. cit., 16.
190
still presupposes the original self-awareness and self-presence. Conceptuali­
sing (e.g. in theology) always relates adequately and asymptotically, albeit 
partially, to the goal o f this self-identity. In this transcendental experience 
cognition always implies the knowing subject’s subject relation to its 
cognition. And the experience also includes -  in a non-thematic (Rahner calls 
its ‘anonymous’) way, namely as a goal -  what we call God. In its un- 
fathomability, says Rahner, the transcendent is always the already self- 
evident. ‘All clear understanding is grounded in the darkness o f  God’.10 
Given this grounding, the unity in theology is basic to the unity o f  theology. 
In this transcendental analysis the various theological disciplines, as well as 
the relation between philosophy (o f religion) and theology, ultimately have 
the same foundation. That is particularly pertinent to the relation between 
dogmatic and foundational theology. Since the 19th century foundational 
theology’s special task has been to secure the internal unity o f theology as a 
science. Thus the emphasis was on epistemological questions associated with 
the knowing subject. Rahner belongs to this tradition and consciously seeks 
to perpetuate it.
Thus there is a long tradition in theological theory o f science that 
grounds the discipline in an epistemological concept. Magnus Striet 
summarises it thus: Immanuel Kant’s project remains valid, namely to 
express the essence o f religion via the dimension o f  human reason ( Vernunft) 
in an anthropologically adequate manner for modem thinkers." Striet goes so 
far as to say that in modem thought Kant is indispensable for any attempt to 
give the rationality o f faith an unquestionable foundation, a fundamentum  
inconcussum}2
From this it is clear what Metz’s category o f mode o f  thinking implies 
for the foundation o f a theological theory o f science. Even though Metz uses 
the term to advocate an anthropological turn in theology by reconstructing it 
in the work o f Thomas Aquinas, in essence he is introducing a pluralistic, 
falsifiable principle into theological theory o f science. After all, the category 
‘mode o f thinking’ intrinsically refers to a particular, historical attribute of 
theological theory o f science. In his book in 1962 Metz still considered mode 
o f thinking to be an ontological category, but by introducing it into theolo­
gical theory o f science -  and that was his innovation -  he made room for a 
historical approach to theological research. Church doctrines, too, are modes 
o f theological thought and in that sense open to criticism. Theology has a
10 Op. cit., 22.
11 Cf. Striet,M. (2005), “Erkenntnis aller Pflichten als göttlicher Gebote” . Bleibende Relevanz 
und Grenzen von Kants Religionsphilosophie, in: Georg Essen & M agnus Striet (Hrsg.), 
Kant und die Theologie, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,162-186, here 167.
12 Op. cit., 168.
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Seinsgeschichte and thus changes as our relationship to reality changes -  in 
fact, it has to keep up with changes if it is to accomplish its fundamental task.
The particular, historical character o f theological theory o f science 
was subsequently elaborated by Metz in projects like his new ‘political 
theology’ and his biographical theology, and in diverse, radical ways by 
many other theologians. Any number o f hermeneutic and contextual theolo­
gies emerged. Today, at the beginning o f the 21st century, it is clear that the 
histories o f the self-emancipation and oppression o f various Christian com­
munities worldwide have become the context o f  many practical hermeneutic 
variants o f theology that often develop in conflict with each other. By 
‘practical hermeneutics’ I mean theologising as critical analysis o f and 
reflection on the ways in which religious communities and individual 
believers in specific situations explore and probe their existence as the scene 
o f  God’s actions. The cardinal question in a practical hermeneutic theology is 
how human life should be interpreted coram Deo in the historical vicissitudes 
and conflicts in which particular ‘actors’ enact their histories, that is to say as 
the scene and the history o f  God’s presence.
New questions and diversity
The theological project o f  accounting for faith finds itself in a totally new and 
complex situation. In all the forums o f public discourse that Tracy1 ’ identifies 
the discussion has, as it were, been turned upside down. The starting point 
can no longer be found in -  at any rate partial -  agreement with the Christian 
religious tradition and in -  at any rate partial -  conformity between present- 
day notions o f rationality on the one hand and scientific theologising on the 
other. In the forum o f  the religious community thinking oriented to God 
(Denken naar God toe -  Piet Schoonenberg’s definition o f theology in his 
farewell lecture in 1977) is faced with an unprecedented situation o f  despair, 
in the forum o f society with an enormous crisis o f meaning, and in the 
scientific forum with conflict, not only about specific arguments but also 
about the meaning and scope o f theological reasoning as such. All this has, in 
a manner o f speaking, inverted the argument and the direction o f the question 
o f theology. Theology needs to find its ‘subject’ (the mystery o f God) anew 
and develop the object (its own argument) anew in terms o f  aesthetic 
experience. And in so doing its concern should still be to account publicly for 
the orientation to God and to accept pluralism as a fundamental enrichment 
of the human condition.
As a result o f  this inversion o f  the dialogue theologians are studying 
the artistic mode as a relevant supplement to the mode o f thinking. That is a
13 Tracy, D. (1981), The analogical imagination: Christian theology and the culture o f  
pluralism , New York: Crossroad.
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major reason for their interest in aesthetics. The theologian Vergauwen 
maintains that nowadays aesthetic experience is the locus t h e o lo g ic u s To 
many aesthetic experience has nothing to do with correspondence between 
the image and what it portrays. Its foundation, says Vergauwen with 
reference to the philosopher Vattimo, is a weak ontology. At the very least it 
implies that in aesthetic experience the only legitimate premise is apologia of 
the self, which has a dialectic structure. The heteronomy (Adorno calls it 
distinctive subjectivity) o f  the artwork becomes a counterforce to the 
autonomy o f the viewer or listener. The aesthetic experience is one o f con­
frontation with a world o f artefacts that are formally heteronomous in that 
they encounter the subject as resistance to the tendency to acquiesce in the 
coercion o f social and cultural systems. Referring to Steiner’s concept o f 
‘real presences’, the Austrian theologian Larcher writes that confrontation 
with such an artefact can, because o f  its formal quality, evoke a new 
awareness o f  the world that leaves the possibility o f  transcendence open. 
Aesthetic experience offers an initial experience and affirmation of some­
thing that makes sense on the borders o f sensation and language.15 A modem 
artwork, says Larcher, can open up the possibility o f freedom in a way that 
summons the viewer or listener to recognise ‘a trace o f the other’ and thus 
tolerate and endure the wounds o f our culture. Confrontation with a modern 
artwork can become an experience o f anticipatory presence.16
The study of aesthetic experience compels theology to broaden its 
concept o f rationality. It has to search for an alternative to the transcendental 
aspect o f reflection. It has to engage with the artistic mode in expressing this 
anticipatory presence. It needs to develop a justification o f  faith based on the 
question o f how to instantiate the human subject. Vergauwen calls this a life 
world form o f rationality,17 in the sense o f forms o f communicative reasoning 
that participants in a concrete life world use to give a communal, meaningful 
account of, and provide a foundation for, the shape imparted to that life 
world. The actual reciprocity between forms o f  profane meaning and forms
14 Cf. Vergauwen, G. (2002), Zustimmung und Stimmigkeit. Die Rationalität theologischer 
Rede, in: P. Neuner, Glaubenswissenschaft? Theologie im Spannungsfeld von Glaube, 
Rationalität und Öffentlichkeit, Freiburg/Basel/W ien: Herder, 99-124, here 101: “D er Ort 
der Gottesrede bzw. der Religion ist die ästhetische Erfahrung."
15 eine anfängliche Bejahung, eine inchoative Erfahrbarkeit des definitiv Verheissenen, in 
sofern sie Sinnknoten, Sinnspeicher an der Grenze von Sprache und Sinnlichkeit bildet in: 
Larcher, G. (1998), Subjekt -  Kunst -  Geschichte. Chancen einer Annäherung von 
Fundamentaltheologie und Ästhetiek, in: K. Müller, Fundamentaltheologie. Fluchtlinien 
und gegenwärtige Herausforderungen, Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet Verlag, 299-321, here
311.
16 Op. cit., 311.
17 Cf. Vergauwen, op. cit., 114.
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o f  religious meaning is the criterion o f the honesty o f this form of theology.18 
Anticipation o f  meaning within the framework o f the contingence o f  all 
reality is the horizon in which research in a societal context can look for 
possible avenues for dialogue between profane and religious themes o f 
finding meaning. The cardinal research themes o f  theology are, firstly, the 
question o f sources that can instantiate the autonomy and freedom o f  the 
human subject, and secondly, whether these sources can be seen as a locus 
theologicus.
In his aforementioned article, Zustimmung und Stimmigkeit. Die 
Rationalität theologischer Rede, Vergauwen indicates that in our present 
cultural context theology needs a new mapping, a reformulation o f its funda­
mental topoi, new parameters. What Vergauwen has in mind is not simply 
augmenting the list o f research themes, but a radical revision o f theology’s 
embedment in everyday reality. He is not interested in modifying the list of 
research themes but in redefining the praxis o f theological reflection 
{Argumentationspraxis). With reference to Max Seckler he points out that in 
Melchior Cano’s work the concept ‘locus theologicus’ indicates not only the 
classification o f  arguments in a series o f problems but also the re-organi­
sation o f its manner o f argumentation. The term ‘locus theologicus' connotes 
which institutions an argument should address in order to do full justice to its 
rationality.
M ethod o f im m anence in theology
A theologian who is interested in developing a life world form o f  rationality 
will find some interesting ideas in the oeuvre o f the French philosopher 
Maurice Blondel (1861-1949). When constructing a theological theory of 
immanent mysticism one cannot disregard Blondel. His theory o f  the role of 
philosophical thought in theological apologetics has decisively changed 
apologetics, known nowadays as foundational theology. It is no longer a 
propaedeutics that uses arguments o f convenience to substantiate a precon­
ceived religious position retrospectively. It has become a research project, in 
which the religious position is defined as an out-and-out rational, philoso­
phical problem, to be studied by means o f  out-and-out rational, philosophical 
analysis.
In 1896 Blondel wrote a number o f articles in the Annales de 
Philosophie chrétienne on “requirements o f  current thought on apologetics 
and on philosophical method when studying the problem o f religion”.19 In
18 This criterion o f  honesty can be traced back to the famous book by A T. Robinson (1969), 
Honest to God, London: SCM.
19 Blondel, M. (1956), Lettre sur les exigences de la pensce en matière d'apologétique et sur la 
méthode de la philosophie dans l’étude du problème religieux (original 1896) in: Les
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these essays he sets out to free the philosophy o f  his day from what he calls 
‘line fausse philosophie\ which puts theology on a false track. He was 
speaking about a particular line o f reasoning in the justification o f faith that 
was very much in vogue in the neo-scholastic theological climate o f his day. 
According to many, church dogma taught that divine revelation truly 
happened and its truth could be proved philosophically; that the supernatural 
order was a historical fact belonging to the realm o f  apodictic knowledge; 
that the philosophical possibility o f revelation can be assimilated into 
theology in a rationally substantiated way as a necessity.
Blondel has two fundamental objections to this line o f reasoning. In 
the first place he points out that belief in God is always a gratuitous gift (un 
don gratuit) and can never be communicated or kindled in the human soul by 
any apologia. Philosophy cannot ‘prove’ this gratuitous gift in any way. In 
the second place one has to consistently distinguish between the two orders 
o f  issues studied in apologetics -  the supernatural and the immanent order -  
in all their unique, inalienable reality, and consequently between the 
respective methodological competencies o f  theology and philosophy as well. 
Blondel adopts a philosophical stance, sees him self as a philosopher and 
holds that from such a point o f view the question o f the factuality (God’s 
revelation in our world) that is confessed in religion should not be ‘mingled’ 
with that o f  reflection on such factuality. That is why he is so intent on 
explaining the philosophical method in the study o f  the religious problem. To 
this end he proposes a ‘method o f immanence’. His exposition reveals an 
explicitly mystical interpretation o f  faith -  which is quite remarkable, con­
sidering the rationalist intellectual climate o f his time. That is why it is worth 
going back to a text by Blondel in our attempt to explain the concept of 
immanent mysticism.
According to Blondel, then, the essence o f  Christianity, in light of 
revelation, cannot be grasped intellectually or substantiated conceptually. 
“From the moment that this Revelation looks us up at home and pursues us 
into our intimacy ... from that moment we face the encounter, trouble erupts, 
the problem is posed.” [Our translation.]20 Some o f this powerlessness must 
be discernible in our original human autonomy (dans I ’homme purement 
Vhomme) and in the most autonomous philosophy. And that brings us to the 
task o f a true philosophy o f  the religious problem. It should reflect on the 
traces o f the supernatural in humans in their original autonomy and, if  it is to 
be a truly autonomous philosophy, it will have to do so using the method of
premiers écrits de Maurice Blondel, edited by Société des Am is de Maurice Blondel, Paris; 
PUF (Our translation.)
211 Lettre, op. cit.. 37. ‘Mais du moment où cette Révélation vient, pour ainsi dire, nous cher­
cher chez nous et nous pourchasser jusqu ‘en notre intimité ... alors la rencontre se fait, la 
difficulté éclate, le problème est pose.’
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immanence. Although at bottom its object (the reality o f belief in God) 
cannot be grasped intellectually or substantiated conceptually, its proper 
method need not be determined by this ‘heteronomy’. Its proper task as 
philosophy is an integral study o f  all the phenomena that make up our inner 
life in their distinctness and interrelationship. Although observations about 
them concern the transcendent, the phenomena themselves are by definition 
immanent. And, just as the immanence o f  philosophical statements about the 
traces o f transcendence in the human person does not acquire a transcendent 
character from the specific object o f study, so one should not jum p to the 
conclusion that the transcendent reality o f the supernatural is in doubt. 
Philosophical statements about traces o f the transcendent in human beings 
qua human beings must stem from an integral21 study o f human actions, 
thought and volition without any religious preoccupation. Such a preoccupa­
tion can be avoided by strictly observing the mutual independence o f the two 
orders in reality (the supernatural and the immanent).
Blondel sees this distinction as dialectical. “The concept of 
immanence can only arise in our minds through the effective presence o f the 
concept o f transcendence.” [Our translation.]22 The precondition for true 
intellectual and moral autonomy is acknowledgment o f true heteronomy. 
Blondel holds out strongly for this dialectics, and not because o f a pedago­
gical approach as if the reality o f the supernatural implied in proclamation 
and confession has to correspond to an observable need for salvation in 
human beings or to a demonstrable question that can find no answer in the 
immanent reality o f human life and therefore opens people up to encounter 
with a transcendent reality ‘from beyond’. The dialectics o f  the concepts of 
immanence and transcendence only emerges sharply if the dimensions of 
‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ are not contrasted as separate lines o f  thought, 
nor interrelated by way o f arguments o f convenience, for that, too, violates 
the formal heterogeneity o f the two orders o f reality. To Blondel truly 
philosophical reflection on the religious problem can have only one legiti-
21 Blondel’s use o f  the word ‘integral’ should be carefully distinguished from the use o f  the 
word in J. M aritain (1937) Humanisme integral. Problèmes temporels et spirituels d'une  
nouvelle chrétienté (Paris: Aubier). M aritain’s humanism conceives o f  human autonomy and 
creaturely and salvation-historical involvement as dimensions o f  a  (practical) perspective on 
the whole o f  reality. That is why his concept o f  integral humanism is so dear to many 
theologians. It is part o f  a Thomist tradition o f  self-renewal via re-sourcing. To Blondel, 
whose position in the philosophical and theological debate o f  his day is best defined as 'anti­
scholastic’ (Virgoulay), it is an epistemological problem that seeks to account for faith and 
relates more closely to questions arising from Kantian analysis o f  human reason. 
Theologically one hears occasional echoes o f  a  tradition dating back to Augustine. In the 
text under discussion 'in tegral' means ‘relating to the totality o f  human actions, knowledge 
and volition’.
22 Lettre, op. cit., 40. “La notion même de l’immanence ne se réalise dans notre conscience que 
par la présence effective de la  notion du transcendant.”
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mate point o f departure that recognises both the autonomy o f philosophy and 
the irreducible originality o f  what theists conceive o f  as revelation. That point 
o f departure is the acknowledgment o f both real continuity and an affirmed, 
formal incompatibility between the order o f the supernatural and the 
immanent order.23
How do we develop our concepts o f transcendence and immanence on 
the basis o f a premise that recognises a dialectics between these two orders of 
reality? That is where the méthode d ’immanence comes in.
To Blondel24 immanence implies that to humans everything that has 
truth as its criterion -  hence ever historical fact, every ‘doctrine’, every obli­
gation that is considered true (even if  the ideas about the things that are 
deemed true have evolved historically) -  necessarily emanates from human 
beings. All truth claims are made by and addressed to human beings and in 
that sense are necessarily autonomous and autochthonous. The autonomy of 
truth claims implies three methodological rules.25 The first is the rule of 
integral experience, which is negative and indirect. That is to say, whatever 
truth claims people make about their experience can be refuted, except on one 
point: truth presents itself. The second is the rule o f invariance. It says that 
free will is a precondition for everything that people seek to accomplish and 
for every means they may choose for this purpose. The third is the rule o f the 
minimum. It says that in our pursuit o f a goal we must acknowledge that its 
truth is refutable, which is the only way to satisfy the precondition o f free 
will. The only way to pursue a goal is the one with the least refutable claims 
(way o f  least resistance).
Hence we need to use the method o f immanence to develop our 
concepts o f  transcendence and immanence if  we are to do justice to the 
dialectical interrelationship between the two orders o f reality. It means that 
people can only conceive o f  this dialectics in terms o f human existence and 
their autonomy in that existence.
In a commentary on Blondel’s philosophical position Jean-Luc 
Marion observes that Blondel’s thinking in his main work, L 'action {1893), is 
characterised by ‘active nihilism’, which should be seen as a form o f meta­
physical thought.26 That explains Blonders point that the dialectical relation­
ship between transcendence and immanence can only be conceived o f in 
terms o f human autonomy in that relationship. To Blondel the will is the 
primary way o f  affirming life. Hence ‘not willing’ is also an affirmation of
21 Cf. Lettre, op. cit., 45.
24 Cf. Lettre, op. cit., 34.
25 Cf. Virgoulay, R. (1992), L ’action de Maurice Blondel -  1893 Relecture pour un 
centenaire, Paris.Beauchesne, 13 ff.
2i> Marion, J-L. (1987), La conversion de la volonté selon “L ’action” , in: Revue Philosophique 
de la France et de l'Etranger, 112e Année, Tome CLXXVI1, 33-46.
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life. According to his own definition27 Blondel’s thought is a second-order 
metaphysics. The only way to exist is the way o f  volition, hence it is the only 
way we can transcend our humanity in action. Action is not an object 
{volonté voulue) o f  the will. It is a way o f willing the objects o f the will 
(volonté voulante). Human beings exist by way o f a will that can never be 
finally fulfilled. “There is infinity in our willed actions, and we cannot pin 
that infinity down in our reflection nor reproduce it through our exertions.” 
[Our translation.]28
Marion shows that Blondel’s thinking harbours an idiosyncratic form 
of nihilism. Blonde] opposes the ascetic ideal because, like Nietzsche, he 
understands that life can only be affirmed by willing Nothing, not by not 
willing anything. The will can will Nothing, but Nothingness cannot annihi­
late the will. All objects o f volition exist only in the will. There are no values 
outside it. But to Blondel the will is not a solitary adventure. It functions in 
an infinity o f  volitive actions that appeals to a mystery which eludes us.29
Thus the dialectics between transcendence and immanence can only 
be conceived o f philosophically in terms o f  human autonomy. Marion sums it 
up as follows. The will never stops keeping finitude in check through the 
power o f the infinite and this engenders a surplus o f  finitude.30 To Blondel 
this benefit is a reality that is immanent in volition, hence can and should be 
conceived o f philosophically. It does not sidestep the philosophical distinc­
tion between ‘willing to will’ (volonté voulante) and ‘willing what is willed’ 
{volonté voulue). Hence the benefit is not a dimension o f human existence 
beyond our personal realisation o f that existence, nor -  as Virgoulay 
explains31 -  is it an instinctive fatality. It is willing that makes people 
rational, human persons. Through willing they establish themselves in an 
autonomous relationship with themselves.
Blondel sees such autonomy as the possibility o f  always having a 
choice not to will the willed value, the object of volition. Willing to will is 
only fully acknowledged when we can will every possible willed value as a 
possible option o f volition, hence a finite value. Willing can never be con­
ceived o f as an all-powerful capacity to will, for that would annihilate it. 
Hence the surplus that eludes us in willing to will leads Blondel to define a 
philosophical concept o f God. If  willing to will does not culminate -  on pain 
o f  self-annihilation -  in an all-powerful capacity to will, then ultimately it 
must be seen as powerless. Infinite willing can only be conceived of as love,
27 Blondel, M. (1950), L action  (1893), Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 464 ("'une sorte de Métaphysique 
à  la seconde puissance").
28 Blondel, L'action, op. cit., 418.
29 Op. cit., 328 (“en sorte qu’à  la source de nos actes un mystérieux inconnu nous échappe’').
30 Marion, op. cit., 39.
51 Virgoulay, R. (1987), “L’action” de M aurice Blondel. Une philosophie de la volonté. In: 
Revue Philosophique de la France et de VEtranger, 112e Annéé, Tome CI.XXVI1, 55-70.
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Blondel writes. He cites William o f Thierry: “Nihil aliud est amor quam 
vehemem in bono voluntas.”32 According to Marion the surplus can only be 
conceived o f  as God’s love for our human willing. Hence Marion concludes 
that Blondel’s idea poses an original question for all forms o f spirituality, and 
above all for Christian spirituality.
Against this background, how should we study mysticism? Blondel 
devoted several works to this question. I first discuss his Le problème de la 
mystique chrétienne (1925),^  then turn to his Carnets intimes (1883-1894)/4
In his commentary on Le problème de la mystique Yves de 
Montcheuil points out that to Blondel connaisance religieuse is a form of 
knowledge that surpasses our imagination, being an extension o f the 
knowledge o f faith.3 Yet Blondel does not see it as ab-normal. For, says 
Blondel, mystical knowledge requires human powers o f discrimination, 
which do not evade rationality. Besides, the mystic cannot evade the faith of 
all members o f the religious community, even if  he knows supernatural 
reality in a different way. Prayer and contemplation are human activities, 
even though the mystic knows that he has been raised to God. Even though 
he knows himself to share the radiance of divine life in human beings -  and 
thus to differ from ‘ordinary believers’ -  the study o f  mystical texts requires 
critical, rational appraisal, for the mystic’s sensibility and perception, 
according to John o f the Cross, are the most rational o f  all human faculties.
In Le problème de la mystique chrétienne Blondel examines the 
religio-philosophical implications o f  his epistemology. In Carnets intimes he 
concentrates on the way his personal position as a believer relates to his role 
as a researcher. Guy Bernard wrote an essay on this relationship36 and, citing 
Blondel, describes it as the restlessness o f the researcher combined with the 
serenity o f  the believer. One can only see oneself, says Blondel, by seeing 
God, seeing oneself as united with God. The believer experiences herself in 
infinite proximity to God, who, as the Word o f love {Agape), is the presence 
that encounters her as the Other. As humans we experience an inner poverty 
in the details o f everyday life, in which we discover and experience the 
possibility o f  the transcendent Other’s kenosis. Hence as a researcher Blondel 
feels he has a clear mission {mission philosophique et apostolique) to make
32 Marion, op. cit., 46.
j3 Blondel, M. (1929), Le problème de la mystique chrétienne, in: Qu est-ce que la M ystique? 
Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée 3, 1-198.
34 Blondel, M. (1961), Carnets intimes (1883-1994), Paris: Ëd. Du Cerf.
35 Montcheuil, Y de SJ (1941), Maurice Blondel. Pages religieuses. Extraits reliés p a r un 
commentaire e t précédés d ’une introduction, Paris: Aubier, 174.
36 Bernard, G. (1987), “L’inquiétude du chercheur sous la sérénité du croyant’’. Les carnets 
intimes de Blondel, in: Revue Philosophique de la France et de l 'Étranger 112e Annéé, 
Tome CLXXVII, 21-32.
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the manifestation of this presence plausible to the limits of human under­
standing.
Here we see most clearly what BlondePs immanent mysticism entails. 
“It means descending into the realities that reveal human beings and con­
tinuing that movement to the end, ‘the end o f  cognition and the curiosity o f 
the mind ..., the end o f sincere and wounded passion, o f suffering and revul­
sion, o f  joy and recognition’.” [Our translation.]37 In this way Blondel seeks 
continually to maintain the dialectics between immanence and transcendence. 
Philosophically he sticks to human autonomy on this road. Willing is the only 
way people can transcend themselves as humans in action. This notion of 
BlondePs reveals a surplus immanence in volition that makes a human being 
an autonomous person. In it the transcendent other encounters humans as 
love. The immanence o f volition, according to Blondel, can only be con­
ceived o f in transcendent terms. The conception o f the immanence o f action 
in its autonomy can only be maintained in terms o f the herteronomy o f  the 
transcendent.
Conclusion
The first paper raised the question o f  what concept o f  transcendence theology 
can develop now that it is challenged -  at any rate in West European society 
-  by a culture o f  immanent mysticism. The second paper pursues the question 
further by inquiring what concept o f theological rationality this would 
require. Following Maurice Blondel’s thought on I ’Action we see that human 
autonomy o f  action implies an affirmation o f  life that cannot be pinned down 
to any metaphysical grounds, which makes it the most original dimension of 
human existence. Secondly, we see that this original dimension o f human 
existence has its counterpart in the affirmation o f a transcendent reality that is 
an infinite presence in this affirmation o f life. The theological rationality that 
is challenged by a culture o f immanent mysticism can be described as a life 
world rationality. It is characterised by a form o f dialectical thought in which 
the elusive affirmation o f life and an awareness o f infinite love for that life 
evoke and reinforce each other.
17 Op.cit., 30. “Il s ’agit de descendre dans les réalités qui manifestent l'hom m e et d ’aller 
ju sq 'au  bout du mouvement qui les porte “au bou de la science et de la curiosité de 
l’esprit..., au bout de la passion sincère et meurtrie, au bout de la souffrance et du dégoût, au 
bout de la jo ie  et de la reconnaissance’” (Carnets 1/333).
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